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GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROLS
AND INFLATION:
A PROGNOSIS BASED ON
THE IMPACT OF CONTROLS IN
THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES*
William K. Jonest
Government price controls in the United States generally
have followed one of two patterns. First, controls have been im-
posed upon specific industries in order to remedy perceived de-
ficiencies in the pricing practices of the industries affected. The
regulation of railroad rates is an example of long standing. Sec-
ond, controls have been imposed on the economy as a whole, en-
compassing virtually all prices and regulating wage levels as well.
Such controls have been imposed several times during wars, and
in recent years have been imposed in peacetime as well.
The United States appears to be moving in radically different
directions with respect to these two types of government price
control programs. As to the first, the attitude is generally negative
and, under the banner of "deregulation," an effort is being made
to reduce government involvement in the pricing decisions of in-
dustries historically subject to specific economic regulation. At the
* This Article was prepared in connection with a speech delivered by the author on
November 5, 1979, for the Robert S. Stevens Lecture series at the Cornell Law School.
Portions of the Article are based on an unpublished monograph, The Impact of Common
Carrier Regulation on Competitive Activities, submitted on behalf of the International Business
Machines Corporation to the Federal Communications Commission in Docket 20828
(Computer Inquiry II) on October 17, 1977. The views expressed are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other person or organization.
I Milton Handler Professor of Trade Regulation, Columbia University School of Law.
A.B. 1952, Columbia University; LL.B. 1954, Columbia University School of Law. Public
Service Commissioner, State of New York, 1970-1974.
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same time, there is a growing concern about inflation and increas-
ing support for government controls to reduce wage and price
increases. The 1970's witnessed the first peacetime imposition of
mandatory wage and price controls and the present program, not
entirely "voluntary," may evolve into a fully mandatory program
if inflation continues at a rapid pace.
Obviously the problem of government price controls is a vast
topic and cannot be covered comprehensively in a single paper.
The objective here is more limited. There is a substantial body of
knowledge concerned with price controls in the regulated indus-
tries. It is informative to consider the manner in which these con-
trols have functioned and to determine whether this experience
sheds any light on more general efforts at price control. The dis-
cussion is essentially in three parts: (1) the application of price
controls to monopoly enterprises; (2) the application of price con-
trols to competitive industries; and (3) the implications of this ex-
perience in judging the prospects of a large-scale program of gov-
ernment price controls.
I
PRICE REGULATION AND MONOPOLY ENTERPRISES1
Monopoly is accepted as desirable, if not inevitable, in some
limited but important sectors of the economy. Generally described
as "natural monopoly" industries, the most prominent are tele-
phone exchange service, electric power supply, and gas transmis-
sion and distribution. The unifying characteristic of natural
monopoly industries is the ability of a single firm to provide the
most economical service to a given area. Within the area reached
by the physical facilities of the firm, the introduction of additional
suppliers requires a wasteful duplication of plant and a significant
increase in cost not normally justified by any benefits to users of
the service. Under such circumstances, monopoly is accepted as
the most appropriate industry structure and the industry is sub-
jected to regulation as a "public utility." 2
I This discussion is based on Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust:
New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 462 (1973) and Jones, Judicial
Determination of Public Utility Rates: A Critique, 54 B.U. L. REv. 873 (1974). See also J. BON-
BRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGU-
LATION (1970); C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION (rev. ed. 1969).
2 For a critique of the natural monopoly thesis as applied to electric power, see
Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Primeaux, Some Problems
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A. The General Pattern of Public Utility Regulation
Most public utility rate regulation occurs in a rigidly defined
environment and follows a prescribed pattern. All services of a
regulated public utility are offered pursuant to a filed tariff and
the company is required to charge customers the prices specified
in the tariff for particular services. Most deviations may be cor-
rected retroactively and deliberate deviations may subject the
company to substantial penalties.
The accounts of the regulated public utility are maintained in
accordance with the requirements of the regulatory agency, usu-
ally set forth in a Uniform System of Accounts. All revenues, ex-
penses, capital accounts and depreciation accruals are subject to
regulatory scrutiny on a continuing basis.
It is possible, by examining the financial records thus main-
tained, to determine the revenues, expenses and capital invest-
ment of the utility for any past period. From such an examination
one may compute the "return" of the company (profits plus in-
terest) and compare this return with the company's capital in-
vestment or "rate base." 3  If the return appears to be excessive,
the regulatory agency or some interested consumer group may
seek to reduce the level of the company's rates. If the return ap-
pears to be deficient, the company may be expected to seek a rate
increase.
The rate proceeding that follows is typically based on some
recent past period called a "test year." The accounts of the utility
provide a common starting point for all participants. Each party
will propose adjustments to the accounts to eliminate or correct
improper or unrepresentative entries and to reflect changes, such
as higher price or wage levels, that will cause future experience to
vary from the experience recorded in the test year. If the varia-
tions are sufficiently pronounced, the agency may use an esti-
mated future test year rather than a recorded past test year; but
estimates for the future must be grounded in experience, so even
here the prior record is pertinent.
With Natural Monopoly, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 63 (1979). On telecommunications, see J.
Meyer, R. Wilson, M. Baughcum, E. Burton & L. Caouette, The Economics of Competition
in the Telecommunications Industry 181-222 (August 1979). While these challenges are
provocative, the author considers the evidence and reasoning to be insufficient to disturb
the general consensus that electric power supply (particularly in transmission and distribu-
tion) and telephone exchange service (particularly within the local exchange) are natural
monopolies.
3 In addition to investment in plant, the rate base includes an allowance for working
capital and materials and supplies.
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After all adjustments have been made, the regulatory agency
will determine the amount of return the utility can be expected to
earn under existing rates and compare this return to the com-
pany's invested capital or rate base. If the projected return is ex-
cessive, the agency will order a rate reduction; if the projected
return is deficient, the agency will permit a rate increase. To de-
termine whether a given return on rate base (or "rate of return")
is proper, the agency examines the capital costs of the company.
The objective is to provide a return sufficiently high that the
company will be in a position to attract capital as needed. Thus,
the return must be high enough to pay interest on bonded in-
debtedness, pay stated dividends on preferred stock, and provide
a sufficient return on equity to permit the company to sell its
common stock on favorable terms (at or above book value).
If a rate increase or decrease is ordered, the company will
reprice its services to obtain the necessary increment or decre-
ment, relying on test year data to determine the dollar impact of
any rate change. The rate change then will be permitted to be-
come effective if the agency is satisfied that its directions have
been properly implemented. At this point, the company once
again is operating pursuant to filed tariffs, with which it is obliged
to comply, until the cycle of rate review and revision is started
anew and carried to completion.
B. The Ratemaking Process
1. Ascertaining the Revenue Requirement
The initial issue in a rate proceeding is the amount of the
company's revenue requirement. The determination of specific
rates is not attempted until a decision has been reached on how
much revenue is needed to support the firm's total regulated op-
erations. The process employed in ascertaining the revenue re-
quirement has a number of important characteristics.
a. Continuity. Much depends on the expectation of continuity
-that the historical test year, when adjusted for unrepresentative
conditions and known changes, will provide a good guide to the
future. Among other aspects, it is generally assumed that any re-
pricing of the company's product will not affect the volume of
consumption substantially.
b. Enforceability. The determinations of the regulatory agency
are generally enforceable. Filed tariffs are explicit and deviations
generally can be detected (although sometimes with difficulty).
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Service tends to be standardized and any reduction or deteriora-
tion in service is subject to regulatory correction.
c. Cost Accounting. The costs of the company are ascertainable
on a continuing basis and subject to regulatory audit. The Uni-
form System of Accounts, while not foolproof, leaves the com-
panies little room for manipulation. At this point it may be useful
to comment on several specific items that pose distinctive prob-
lems.
The allowance for depreciation is said to be inexact because it
is dependent on the life of the plant, which can only be estimated.
But three characteristics of public utility accounting tend to miti-
gate this imprecision: (1) utility depreciation accounting is almost
invariably straight-line depreciation, so that the only uncertainty is
the life of the plant (and perhaps salvage value); (2) for much of
utility plant there is a significant body of prior experience that
permits reasonably accurate estimates; and (3) where the estimates
prove faulty, corrections are relatively easy to implement- depre-
ciation accruals can be revised to reflect changes in expected plant
lives without significant impact on either the company or the con-
sumer. The consumer pays once, and only once, for any given
plant. If depreciation is initially inadequate, the consumer's rates
will be lower in the initial period and higher in the later period. If
depreciation is initially excessive, the consumer's rates will be
higher in the initial period and lower in the later period.
The determination of the allowable rate of return also is said
to be inexact. There is some truth to this, but the problem is not a
serious one. Several factors must be considered: (1) the major part
of the capital costs of most utilities is known with considerable
precision, since interest on bonds and dividends on preferred
stock constitute about fifty percent of the return; (2) the return
on equity can only be estimated, but various estimation techniques
usually produce results within a limited range (between twelve
and fifteen percent in typical cases); and (3) it is possible to check
utility rate-making determinations against results in the capital
markets. If the utility earns the allowed return and is unable to
finance on reasonable terms, the return was too low and should
be revised upward. If the utility's common stock starts selling at a
substantial premium above book value, this is strong evidence that
the return is too high and should be revised downward. As with
depreciation, it is important to remember that rate regulation is a
continuing process and that the agency can correct its errors in
subsequent proceedings.
1980]
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Brief mention should also be made of the treatment of taxes.
In general, taxes are an expense and are allowed as a cost of op-
eration as they are incurred. The Internal Revenue Code, how-
ever, through devices such as accelerated depreciation 4 and the
investment tax credit,5 may defer or excuse a tax payment. Most
regulatory agencies would prefer to allow utilities to deduct tax
payments only as and when they are made, but the Code in some
instances prevents this course of action by making the special dis-
pensation available only on stated conditions. This places regula-
tory commissions in an awkward position. Either they accept the
congressionally mandated conditions and allow deductions for
"phantom taxes" that are not payable currently or may never be
paid, or they limit the utility to actual taxes, which means that the
tax benefit is forfeited and the "phantom taxes" become real
taxes. Most regulatory agencies permit the recognition of "phan-
tom taxes," which increases the return to investors at no expense
to consumers. Indeed, consumers typically benefit, since the
"phantom taxes" may be employed sub silentio as a basis for reduc-
ing the allowed rate of return. To check on whether this is actu-
ally the case, reference can be made to the comparison of market
value and book value of utility shares to determine whether the
shares are in fact selling at a substantial premium over book
value, thus indicating possible excess revenues.
d. Realization of Profit. While the rates of a utility are based
on the historical and anticipated costs of the company, there is no
guarantee that the company will earn any level of profit. In recent
years, primarily as a result of worsening inflation, utilities fre-
quently fail to earn their allowed rate of return. For this con-
tingency, there is no redress. Utility rates are generally fixed on a
prospective basis and, until revised in a new proceeding, the tariff
rates remain effective even though the utility may be earning
more or less than anticipated. One exception to this rule is the
automatic adjustment clause - the fuel adjustment clause in elec-
tric tariffs and the purchased gas adjustment clause in gas tariffs.
These permit upward or downward adjustments, month by
month, to reflect changes in the price paid by the utility for fuel
or purchased gas. The rationale for special treatment is that these
particular expenses represent a large part of the costs of the par-
ticular companies, are largely beyond the control of utility man-
4 I.R.C. § 167.
' Id. § 38.
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agements, and are subject to ready ascertainment and verification.
These automatic adjustment clauses have been criticized, but they
can be implemented by a competent agency staff to eliminate any
improper uses and they do protect the financial viability of the
utilities against uncontrollable volatility in the energy markets.
e. Labor Costs. It should be noted that regulatory commissions
rarely become involved in the labor relations activities of the util-
ity. The results of collective bargaining agreements normally are
accepted as establishing the proper level of pay for unionized
employees, and salary scales for other employees, including execu-
tive compensation, are accepted as proper if reasonably related to
the pay scale of unionized workers and pay levels elsewhere for
employees with similar functions and responsibilities.
f. Cost Control. Finally, there is the question of cost control
generally (of which labor compensation is one aspect). If costs can
be passed along to rate-payers without serious question, is there
any incentive to control costs and to conduct efficient operations?
There are two incentives for efficient operation. In the short run,
it should be recalled, the utility must operate under a filed tariff;
it can keep whatever profits it earns and will not be reimbursed
for any earnings deficiencies. Since there is almost always a sig-
nificant delay in changing rates - from several months to several
years depending on the regulatory regime and type of case- the
utility has a substantial incentive to live within the fixed tariff
rates. The phenomenon is known as "regulatory lag" and its in-
fluence is well recognized (the exemption of electric fuel cost and
purchased gas cost from this influence is a subject of continuing
criticism). In the longer term, the company recognizes that
technology, consumer preferences and institutional arrangements
are not immutable. Accordingly, it seeks to maintain a low-cost
posture to be in a favorable position in the face of future adver-
sity. There is also a substantial commitment to growth among util-
ity managements, which usually cannot be achieved without con-
taining costs.
2. The Determination of Specific Rates
The revenue requirement is important because it is the start-
ing point in the design of specific rates. Sales in the test year must
be repriced in such a way as to yield, in the aggregate, the rev-
enue requirement ascertained by the preceding methodology.
It would be tempting to say that the whole is the sum of its
parts, not only in revenues but in costs, and proceed to determine
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the cost of each utility service offering. Many utility cases do in-
deed attempt to divide the total costs of the enterprise among the
various services and to price each service accordingly. But the
methodology is almost invariably flawed. Because of widespread
joint and common costs it is often not possible to arrive at a
method of cost allocation that can be defended. For example, the
typical telephone instrument is employed in making local calls, in-
trastate toll calls and interstate toll calls. There is no economically
sound basis for allocating the cost of that instrument, or other
so-called "traffic insensitive plant," among the three types of ser-
vice. Similar problems arise in gas and electric distribution with
respect to that portion of the distribution plant that is required as
a minimum system irrespective of the demand imposed upon it.
In general, however, it is easier to allocate gas and electric utility
costs on a theory of causation than it is to allocate important as-
pects of telephone system costs.
Another problem with pricing individual services is that, to be
efficient in the economic sense, the price should be fixed at the
marginal or incremental cost of providing the service. Marginal
cost will differ from an allocation of historical cost for at least
three reasons: (1) the problem of joint and common costs previ-
ously discussed (aggravated in some cases by so-called "sunk costs"
which had to be incurred in the past but may not be required in
the future); (2) the disparity between historical costs and current
costs resulting from inflation; and (3) the difference between his-
torical costs and current costs resulting from changes in technol-
ogy and industry practice.
The first factor tends to depress marginal costs in relation to
allocated historical costs by ignoring all costs, other than the in-
crement, in pricing a particular service. The second factor, infla-
tion, tends to increase marginal costs in relation to historical costs,
because new plant (imposing costs in the form of depreciation,
property taxes, return on investment and taxes on return) gener-
ally is more expensive, sometimes much more expensive, than
existing plant. The third factor, changes in technology and indus-
try practice, may cut either way. In some cases, as in segments of
the telecommunications industry, new plant is so much more effi-
cient than old plant that marginal cost is less than historical cost.
In other cases, such as electric power, changes in technology de-
signed to meet environmental criteria may increase the price of
the plant and lead to marginal costs higher than historical costs.
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The impact of these conflicting factors will vary from case to
case, but it would be only by contrivance or coincidence that the
sum of the marginal costs of all the services would equal the rev-
enue requirement of the company. In electric power, the sum of
the marginal costs almost certainly will exceed the revenue re-
quirement. In telecommunications, the opposite is almost certainly
the case. In gas supply and distribution, the answer is uncertain
depending on whether a particular delivery system is operating at
or near capacity and whether expansion is contemplated.
There are essentially two ways to bridge the gap between
marginal cost pricing and the traditionally calculated revenue re-
quirement. In general, economists would prefer to use gov-
ernmental taxes or subsidies to make possible utility rates at mar-
ginal costs: taxing away the excess if marginal prices yield more
than the revenue requirement and providing a subsidy if marginal
prices yield less than the revenue requirement. Another approach,
which has some support in regulatory circles, is to resort to price
discrimination, adjusting the rates of customers with relatively in-
elastic demands to make up any difference, since prices to such
customers can be varied without substantially affecting output. In
practical terms, this would have radically different impacts in the
different utility industries. In electric power, where the sum of
marginal costs exceeds the revenue requirement, the utility might
be directed to reduce the minimum charge and charges for initial
blocks of electricity, since such use is likely to be unaffected by
price. In telecommunications, by contrast, where the sum of the
marginal costs is likely to be less than the revenue requirement,
the additional revenue might be derived by ordering an increase
in the fixed monthly charge, since the customer can respond only
by ceasing to remain a subscriber. This is an area of great uncer-
tainty, and thus far no regulatory commission has articulated a
wholly satisfactory solution to the marginal cost pricing problem.
Even so, there is little doubt that price discrimination among dif-
ferent services has been employed to recover a larger proportion
of joint and common costs from customers with inelastic demands
who are not expected to contract their purchases in response to
price increases. 6
6 The design of particular rates can be improved by revising the method of measuring
consumption. For example, electric usage is metered, but the metering is inadequate be-
cause it fails to distinguish between use during the peak hours, when marginal costs are
1980]
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Another possibility is to leave the pricing of individual utility
services to utility management subject to an overall revenue con-
straint. This was the widespread regulatory practice ten or fifteen
years ago, and the practice recurs today with some frequency.
The problem with this approach is that the resulting price struc-
ture may discriminate among customer classes to an extent not
justified by any legitimate economic considerations. It may also
have a distorting effect on the investment program of the utility,
inflating capital plant to serve new customer demands that fail to
provide revenue sufficient even to cover the marginal costs of ser-
vice. This is the now famous "Averch-Johnson" effect which has
been a subject of great controversy among economists. 7 . The dis-
tortion can be significantly reduced, if not eliminated, by carefully
reviewing both the investment and pricing policies of the utility.
From this brief summary, which omits many complexities and
highly controversial topics, it is apparent that price control is no
easy task even under conditions that are particularly favorable:
1. A single firm with a monopoly position;
2. A relatively standardized service as the basic offering;
3. Continuing supervision of the prices of the company;
4. Continuing supervision of the service of the company;
5. Continuing supervision of the accounts of the company;
6. A large measure of continuity from one year to the next;
and
7. The ability to reprice all or most of the utility's services
without affecting volume of consumption materially.
Even under these relatively favorable conditions, natural
monopoly regulation has been challenged by some as unnecessary,
harmful or ineffective. 8 The historical record of the major public
very high, and use during off-peak hours, when marginal costs are very low. There has
been some movement toward time-of-day metering to correct the deficiency, a practice
already in effect for interstate toll telephone calls. For most telephone exchanges, however,
there is no metering of local calls, and local telephone charges are independent of usage
even though increased usage, especially at times of peak demand, imposes additional costs.
See R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 29-33 (1979); J. Meyer, R.
Wilson, M. Baughcum, E. Burton & L. Caouette, supra note 2, at 103-55.
The original analyses were included in Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962), and Wellicz, Regulation of Natural Gas
Pipeline Companies: An Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963). For a review of the
implications and a bibliography of intervening literature, see E. BAILEY, ECONOMIc THEORY
OF REGULATORY CONSTRAINT (1973). See also Johnson, The Averch-Johnson H)pothesis After
Ten Years, in REGULATION IN FURTHER PERSPECTIVE 67 (W. Shepherd & T. Gies eds. 1974).
See generally Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968); Jordan,
Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. &
EcoN. 151, 155-64 (1972); MacAvoy, The Effectiveness of the Federal Power Commission, 1 BELL
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utilities is not without flaws. But on the whole profits have been
effectively limited, service has been made widely available, and
productivity gains and price levels compare favorably with other
sectors of the economy. 9
II
PRICE REGULATION AND COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES
A. Causes and Effects of Regulation
The same regulatory controls that have been applied to
monopoly enterprises also have been applied to competitive indus-
tries. It is illuminating to consider both the causes and effects of
this development.' 0
The initial problem arose in connection with the railroad in-
dustry. In one sense, railroads could be viewed as natural
monopolies. Between a single pair of points with limited traffic a
single railroad might well be the most economical mode of opera-
tion."1 However, railroads were not constructed between single
pairs of points, but were developed as lines connecting sequences
of multiple points, including common ownership of multiple lines
interconnecting with one another. As railroads were constructed
J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 271 (1970); MacAvoy & Noll, Relative Prices on Regulated Transactions
of the Natural Gas Pipelines, 4 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 212 (1973); Moore, The Effective-
ness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970); Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). See also Jarrell, The Demand for State
Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1978).
9 See generally Kahn, Inducements to Superior Performance: Price, in PERFORMANCE UNDER
REGULATION 88 (H. Trebing ed. 1968); Phillips, The Effectiveness of State Commission Regula-
tion, in A CRITIQUE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 71, 79-80 (W.
Samuels & H. Trebing eds. 1972); Shepherd, Utility Growth and Profits Under Regulation, in
UTILITY REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 3, 6-31 (W. Shepherd & T.
Gies eds. 1966); Wien, Fair Rate of Return and Incentives -Some General Considerations, in
PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION, supra, at 39; cf. Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regula-
tion: Plausible Policies for an Imperfect World, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS 187 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970) (recognizing general efficiency of utilities while proposing
revisions in regulatory approach); Hughes, Scale Frontiers in Electric Power, in TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 44 (W. Capron ed. 1971) (recognizing efficiency
advances in electric power while criticizing some aspects of regulatory policy).
10 This treatment is not exhaustive, but it does encompass the major competitive sectors
to which common carrier regulation has been applicable for substantial periods of time.
For a discussion of the inefficiencies engendered by more recent efforts to control oil
prices, see STUDY GROUP, ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (H. Landsberg chmn. 1979).
II See generally A. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION (1885); H. ADAMS, Relation of the
State to Industrial Action, in RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND ECONOMICS
AND JURISPRUDENCE 59 (J. Dorfman ed. 1954) (originally published in 1887).
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and consolidated, there came into being multiple parallel lines be-
tween certain points, and even more numerous non-parallel lines
connecting pairs of points (or providing competitive connections
when considered in conjunction with available water carriers). A
pattern emerged in which some points, notably small com-
munities, were served by a single railroad, while larger com-
munities normally were connected by a multiplicity of direct and
indirect routes. The problem was complicated by the formation of
unstable railroad price-fixing arrangements, which sought to
maintain noncompetitive prices among competing carriers but did
so with uneven impact. The net result was that small communities
and small shippers often were confronted by a single carrier or a
group of cooperating carriers, while larger communities and
larger shippers were able to obtain more favorable treatment by
playing on the competitive instincts of the carriers. 2 While other
problems were present, the dominant theme in early federal rail-
road regulation was the prevention of these kinds of discrimina-
tion.13
Initial efforts sought to retain competition while attempting
to control the discriminatory practices that were the products of
the uneven pattern of monopoly and competition.' 4 In 1920, the
emphasis shifted away from competition (without abandoning it
entirely) and toward greater government control.' 5  More re-
cently -in 1940,'6 1958,'7 and 197618- Congress has sought to
12 See generally G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); P. MAcAVoY,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 1900 (1965); Harbeson, Railroads and Regulation,
27 J. ECON. HIsT. 230 (1970); Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. L. &
ECON. 87 (1966); Spann & Erickson, The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Carteliza-
tion and Regulation, I BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 227 (1970). Of all the regulated indus-
tries, the railroads are the most difficult to classify. At particular times and with respect to
particular routes and particular classes of traffic, the railroads probably have significant
natural monopoly characteristics.
I3 See S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1886).
14 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (currently codified in scat-
tered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
1- Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, §§ 406-441, 41 Stat. 456 (currently codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887). See H.R.
REP. No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); S. REP. No. 304, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919); 1
I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 177-244 (1931).
16 Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (currently codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
11 Transportation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, 72 Stat. 568 (currently codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
,1 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90
Stat. 31 (to be codified in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.).
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move back toward increased reliance on competition, emphasizing
the competition between railroads and other modes of surface
transportation (motor and water). 19
Meanwhile, influenced to some extent by the problems of the
railroads and to some extent by the anticompetitive philosophy
generated by the Great Depression, Congress brought motor car-
riers (1935),20 water carriers (1940),21 and freight forwarders
(1942)22 under regulation. None of these industries had natural
monopoly characteristics at the time regulation was initiated or at
any later time.23 Airlines were subjected to similar regulatory
controls in 1938,24 relying in part on natural monopoly theory but
with no evidence that airlines in fact possessed natural monopoly
characteristics.2 5 Most subsequent studies agree that the airline
industry is not a natural monopoly.2 6  In another area, the Su-
preme Court in 1954 brought natural gas producers under
economic regulation by extending to them a statute clearly de-
I9 See S. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 87-89 (1940); 104 CONG. REc.
10822, 10841-43, 10858-59, 12524, 12531, 15528 (1958). See also P. MAcAvoY & J. SNOW,
RAILROAD REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM (1977).
20 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c and scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
21 Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (currently codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
22 Interstate Commerce Act of 1942 (Part IV), ch. 318, 56 Stat. 284 (currently codified
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
23 Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative Analysis,
19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 261, 279-99 (1961). See also J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON
& C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 211-22,
235-38 (1939); Moore, Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETI-
TION IN REGULATED MARKETS 55 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Peck, Competitive Policy for Transpor-
tation, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST POLICY 244 (A. Phillips ed. 1965).
24 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
25 Jones, supra note 23, at 300-12.
26 See R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 55-97 (1962); G. DOUGLAS & J.
MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT 6-18 (1974); W. JORDAN,
AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 195-96, 242-43 (1970); L. KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF
ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION 73-99 (1951); Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk Air-
line Industry: Too Much or Too Little?, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS
13 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Eads, Nerlove & Raduchel, A Long-Run Cost Functionfor the Local
Service Airline Industry: An Experiment in Non-Linear Estimation, 51 REv. ECON. & STAT. 258
(1969); Gordon, Airline Costs and Managerial Efficiency, in TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 61
(1969); Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry Into Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 192 (1955); Phillips, Air Transportation in the United States, in TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 123 (W. Capron ed. 1971).
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signed for the regulation of natural gas pipelines. 27  Natural gas
pipelines have strong natural monopoly characteristics; natural
gas producers do not.28
There is a growing consensus that all of these regulatory
programs have been monumental failures, in some cases border-
ing on disaster.
The railroad problem is familiar to any student of American
history. An intrinsically efficient and effective mode of transporta-
tion has been maintained at (or over) the brink of financial col-
lapse for more than sixty years.2 a Increasingly large shares of
traffic have been yielded to other (often less efficient) modes of
transportation. °  Service standards have deteriorated to the point
where major safety hazards are presented in routine operations
and trains must be run at substandard speeds to prevent derail-
ments.3 1  The rate of innovation has been hampered, particularly
in the implementation of known advances in technology, which
some railroads can afford and others cannot.32  The most recent
blot on a dismal record was the collapse of the Northeastern rail-
roads leading to the consolidation of most of them into a quasi-
governmental corporation (Conrail). 33
27 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
28 S. BREYER & P. MACAVoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
59-64 (1974); P. MACAVOY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS (1962); McKie, Mar-
ket Structure and Uncertaintv in Oil and Gas Exploration, 74 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1960).
29 A. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION 177-79 (1969);
G. HILTON, THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1958, at 10-14 (1969); A. MARTIN, ENTERPRISE
DENIED: ORIGINS OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, 1897-1917 (1971); J. NELSON,
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 193-232, 374-411 (1959); D. PEGRUM,
TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 476-83 (rev. ed. 1968); U.S. TASK FORCE
ON RAILROAD PRODUCTIVITY, IMPROVING RAILROAD PRODUCTIVITY 83-85 (1973); Nelson, The
Changing Economic Case for Surface Transport Regulation, in PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANS-
PORTATION POLICY 5-39 (J. Miller ed. 1975); Prince, Railroads and Government Policy, 48 VA.
L. REV. 196-98, 236-37 (1962); Weller, Access to Capital Markets, in THE FUTURE OF AMERI-
CAN TRANSPORTATION 83 (E. Williams ed. 1971). See also H. LEVINE, NATIONAL TRANSPOR-
TATION POLICY: A STUDY OF STUDIES (1978).
30 See BUREAU OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, ICC, INTERCITY TON-MILES:
1939-1959 (Statement No. 6103, 1961), corrected and supplemented by BUREAU OF ECONOMICS,
ICC, TRANSPORT ECONOMICS, Jan. 1966, at 2 and id., May 1966, at 5 and id., Sept.-Oct.
1971, at 4, 7; [1974] ICC ANN. REP. 120-21. From 1939 to 1973, the railroads' share of
intercity ton-miles declined from 62.3 percent to 38.4 percent.
I1 There were 10,423 reportable railroad accidents in 1976, an increase of 30% over
the prior year. TRAFFIC WORLD, July 25, 1977, at 32.
32 See A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 29, at 88-98; P. MAcAVoY & J. SLOSS, REGULATION
OF TRANSPORT INNOVATION (1967); U.S. TASK FORCE ON RAILROAD PRODUCTIVITY, supra
note 29, at 65-82, 284-86, 307-11; Gellman, Surface Freight Transportation, in TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 9, at 166.
33 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 301, 87 Stat. 985
(currently codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.). Two important Midwestern rail-
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The trucking industry is more prosperous and dynamic than
the railroads, benefiting to a significant degree from regulatory
mismanagement of its major competitor. But the results of truck
regulation can best be described as bizarre. Because of restrictions
on entry and other regulatory controls, the regulated truckers op-
erate as a cartel, exacting monopoly profits from shippers. 34  Yet
the statute is riddled with exceptions, and 55 to 60 percent of
intercity truck movements are exempt from economic regula-
tion.35  The nature of both the exemptions and the regulatory re-
quirements has created a level of inefficiency condemned by numerous
observers.3 " The motor vehicle-which has as its major virtue an
intrinsic capacity for flexibility-is locked into narrowly defined
routes, carrying restricted commodities, and often operating empty or
at less than full capacity. The irrational nature of the regulatory regime
and the trucking cartel that it fosters and protects has spawned a
vigorous illegal truck industry, able to maintain profitable operations
against an inefficient and cartelized regulated truck industry. 37
Regulation of the airlines has followed a similar pattern. The
nature of CAB regulation has been not unlike the administration
of an airline cartel, inflating prices at the expense of consum-
ers.38  The only difference is that a cartel might have been ex-
roads, the Milwaukee and the Rock Island, are undergoing dismemberment as a result of
insolvencies.
34 A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 29, at 74-75; T. MOORE, TRUCKING REGULATION (1976);
Annable, The ICC, the IBT and the Cartelization of the American Trucking Industy, 13 Q. REV.
ECON. & Bus., Summer 1973, at 33, 42; Farmer, The Case for Unregulated Truck Transporta-
tion, 46 J. FARM. ECON. 398 (1964); Moore, supra note 23; Moore, The Beneficiaries of Truck-
ing Regulation, 21 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1978); Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight Transportation:
A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 327 (1970).
", [1974] ICC ANN. REP. 121.
36 See Gellman, supra note 32; Miller, Effects of Regulation on Truck Utilization, 13
TRANSP. J. 5 (1973); Moore, supra note 16; Nelson, The Effects of Entry Control in Surface
Transport, in TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS, supra note 26, at 381. See also ICC, EMPTY/
LOADED TRUCK MILES ON INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS DURING 1976 (1977); REGULATION OF
ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (P. MacAvoy & J. Snow eds. 1977).
37 ICC Chairman O'Neal claimed that sham agricultural cooperatives were diverting
350 million dollars of annual revenues from regulated carriers. NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULA-
TORY UTIL. COMM'RS, BULL. No. 25, at 25 (1977). See generally BUREAU OF TRANSPORT
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, ICC, GRAY AREA OF TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS (1960).
31 See Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaq, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
38-58 (1975) (statement of Thomas E. Kauper); R. CAVES, supra note 26, at 140-68; G.
DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 26, at 80-103; W. JORDAN, supra note 26, at 57-156; Eads,
Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry: Too Much or Too Little?, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS, supra note 23, at 13; Gordon, supra note 26; Keeler,
Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 3 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 399 (1972); Smiat,
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pected to do the job better, leading to higher profits for the in-
dustry and possibly lower prices for consumers. Public and indus-
try disenchantment led to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.39
The natural gas story also is well known.40  Federal ceilings
on natural gas producer prices resulted in an imbalance between
supply and demand. For years, natural gas was consumed more
rapidly than new supplies could be obtained. The result was a
reduction of supply to the point where neither peak nor annual
demands for gas could be met. Industries dependent on gas
supplies were curtailed in their operations and were shut down
completely for limited periods. Residential consumers of gas were
not far removed from interruptions in supply that could work
major hardships. Natural gas users, deprived of supplies, imposed
additional demands on other energy sources, aggravating energy
problems elsewhere. Again public and industry dissatisfaction led
to a legislative program of deregulation. 41
B. The Problems of Regulation
While these industries and the problems they present vary
widely in many particulars, they have one thing in common. In
each case an effort was made to apply public utility controls to an
industry lacking monopoly characteristics. There are intrinsic dif-
ficulties in such an approach which seriously jeopardize the suc-
cess of the effort and which in most cases can be expected to
produce unsatisfactory results.
Helliesen & Eichner, Inc., The Intrastate Air Regulation Experience in Texas and California, in
REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG THE AIRLINES 41 (P. MacAvoy
& J. Snow eds. 1977); Snow, The Problems of Airlines Regulation and the Ford Administration
Proposalfor Reform, in id. at 3; Note, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and
National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE LJ. 1416 (1965).
a9 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
40 See S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL COMMIS-
SION 72-88 (1974); R. HELMS, NATURAL GAS REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF FPC PRICE
CONTROLS (1974); P. MACAVOY & R. PINDYCK, PRICE CONTROLS AND THE NATURAL GAS
SHORTAGE (1975); Erickson & Spann, Supply Response in a Regulated Industry; The Case of
Natural Gas, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 94 (1971); Hughes & Francis, Regulation and the
Energy Crisis, in A CRITIQUE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, supra
note 9, at 217, 219-34, 277-86; Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the
Federal Power Commission, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, supra note 9, at
169; MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J.L. & EcON. 167 (1971);
MacAvoy & Pindyck, Alternative Regulatory Policies for Dealing with the Natural Gas Shortage, 4
BELL 1. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 454 (1973).
41 The resulting legislation was the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621,
92 Stat. 3350 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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1. The Problem of Price Level
The method of determining the proper price level for a
monopoly enterprise cannot be applied to a competitive industry
without straining the methodology to the breaking point.
First, instead of a single firm there are multiple firms, each
with different investments and expenses. A price level that is satis-
factory for one firm will provide excessive revenues for another
firm with lower costs, and deficient revenues for a third firm with
higher costs. To set prices at the high end of the range is to ad-
minister the industry as a cartel to the detriment of consumers.
To set prices at the low end of the range is to condemn the
higher cost firms to inadequate earnings which almost certainly
will lead to inadequate service. This problem has been present
since the inception of railroad regulation and has not been satis-
factorily resolved in the case of railroads or any other industry
with multiple competing firms.42
Second, the assumption that services will remain relatively
stable in the face of changes in price levels is wholly unwarranted
in a multi-firm industry. If prices are set too high, service volumes
will expand artificially to soak up the excess revenues (as has hap-
pened repeatedly in airline regulation).43  If prices are set too
low, services will be curtailed in an effort to maintain financial
solvency (as has happened repeatedly in railroad regulation). 44
Moreover, wholly apart from such general shifts, individual firms
may revise service offerings in unpredictable ways in an effort to
achieve a competitive advantage.
42 The Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, introduced a program under
which railroad rates were to be fixed for the railroad system as a whole, with recapture of
"excess earnings" from strong roads and provision of financial support for weak roads.
This program proved unsatisfactory, and was repealed by the Emergency Railroad Trans-
portation Act, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211 (1933). See P. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION
404-11 (7th ed. 1972). The CAB attempted to set industry-wide rate levels for air carriers
in General Passenger Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291 (1960), and Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation, No. 21866 (C.A.B. 1970-74), partially reprinted in CAB, DOMESTIC
PASSENGER-FARE INVESTIGATION, JANUARY 1970 TO DECEMBER 1974 (1976) (particularly
Phases 6B, 7 and 8).
43 See R. CAVES, supra note 26, at 251-52, 331-55; G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note
26, at 39-57; W. FRUHAN, THE FIGHT FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: A STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC TRUNK CARRIERS 124-52 (1972); W. JORDAN, supra note 26, at
34-56; Eads, supra note 38; Keeler, supra note 38; Phillips, supra note 26.
44 In addition to abandonments of entire lines and discontinuations of passenger ser-
vice, there have been impairments in service attributable to shortages of freight cars, in-
adequacies in terminal and switching facilities, and insufficient maintenance of main-line
tracks (contributing to derailments and requiring limitations on train speed).
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Third, some of the critical variables that are required in
order to establish an appropriate price are almost unknowable in
competitive situations. A monopolist, with experience in a reason-
ably assured market, can predict the volume of its output and the
service lives of its equipment with some measure of certainty. But
if service offerings are subject to competition, the volume to be
sold and the service lives of the equipment involved will be de-
pendent on the relative success and rate of innovation among
competitors, factors that are difficult to predict. The cost of capi-
tal, a difficult problem even for monopolies, is greatly complicated
when a multiplicity of firms is involved. The prospect for error,
therefore, is substantially increased.
Fourth, and particularly significant in connection with the
prior point, the opportunities for living with, or correcting, errors
are greatly reduced in multi-firm industries. In a monopoly situa-
tion, a price that is set too high or too low is not without effect.
Consumers will be exploited in the first instance and investors de-
prived in the second. But the long-term viability of the industry
normally is not affected. The error will become evident in the
agency's review of the company's financial position, and the price
level will be revised (albeit with some delay). The availability of
new capital to the company may be temporarily impeded in the
event of inadequate earnings, 45 but even this effect is moderated
if there is confidence in the investor community that there will be
a timely upward revision in the monopoly firm's price level. In
the case of multi-firm industries, the line of causation from the
agency's determinations to the industry's earnings is obscured by
the competitive actions and reactions of the affected firms. It is
often unclear whether the agency will, or can, correct its errors.
The changes in price and service triggered by an initial erroneous
agency decision may make it unfeasible to reverse that decision.
The chronic errors in price ceilings applicable to railroads (too
low), 46 airlines (too high),47 and natural gas producers (too low) 48
provide eloquent testimony on this point. No such chronic and
damaging errors have afflicted the regulated monopoly enter-
- prises for significant periods of time.
" See generally joskow & MacAvoy, Regulation and the Financial Condition of the Electric
Power Companies, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1975).
" See note 29 supra.
47 See note 38 supra.
48 See note 40 supra.
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Finally, the decisional process in multi-firm price level regula-
tion has failed to develop any meaningful solutions to the prob-
lems presented. For years, price levels in the motor carrier indus-
try were regulated by reference to an "operating ratio" (ratio of
certain expenses to total revenues) which had no demonstrated
relationship to any matter of regulatory concern. 49  The deficien-
cies in the operating ratio have led to its subordination in the
regulatory process, 50 but the substitute methodology defies de-
scription.5' Railroad rate levels are regulated largely by findings:
(1) that existing rate levels are inadequate, (2) that proposed
higher levels either are marginal or inadequate, and (3) that the
proposed higher levels will be permitted, but with designated ex-
ceptions and limitations. 52  Natural gas producer price regulation
attempted to employ conventional methodology, but the cost fac-
tors were so elusive that almost any result could be justified -and
widely disparate results were in fact "justified" within very short
time spans. 53  The conventional methodology employed in airline
price regulation was applied with more rigor, but the determina-
tions of the agency and the operations of the industry had little
relation to one another; predicted earnings levels generally failed
to materialize in the airline industry.54
49 See NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, METHODS FOR TESTING THE
REASONABLENESS OF MOTOR CARRIER EARNINGS (1967); Stelzer, Rate Base Regulation and
Some Alternatives, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 25, 1969, at 17, 22-25.
" See Goodman, Recent Trends in Transport Rate Regulation, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1225,
1249-56 (1972); Levine, A Historical Analysis of the Criteria to Determine the Revenue Need of
Motor Common Carriers, 40 ICC PRAC. J. 158 (1973).
51 Compare General Increase, July 1972, Eastern Central Territory, 343 I.C.C. 1 (1973)
with General Increase, Rocky Mountain Territories, 341 I.C.C. 821 (1972) and General
Increase, East-South Territory, 341 I.C.C. 735 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Ex Parte No. 310, Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 1975, Nationwide,
ICC Orders of Mar. 21 and Apr. 8, 1975.
5' In June 1974, the FPC set the price of "new" natural gas (transactions on or after
January 1, 1973) at 42 cents per Mcf. National Rates for Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 4
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 401 (1974). In December 1974, on rehearing, the price was in-
creased to 50 cents per Mcf. 52 F.P.C. 1604, 8 PUB. U. RPP. (PUR) 4th 209 (1974). The
FPC's orders were sustained in Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975). In July
1976, the FPC established a price of $1.01 for gas newly dedicated in 1973 and 1974, and
a price of $1.42 for gas dedicated on or after January 1, 1975. National Rates for Natural
Gas, 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 21 (1976). In November 1976, on rehearing, the FPC
reaffirmed the $1.42 price for post-1974 gas, but reduced the price for 1973-74 gas to 93
cents per Mcf. 17 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 317 (1976). The FPC's orders were sustained in
American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
907 (1978).
54 As former CAB Chairman John E. Robson observed several years ago: "Only three
times in the past 26 years, and never in the past decade, has the industry earned the
presently allowable 12 per cent return on investment." TRAFFIC WORLD, July 18, 1977, at
14.
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2. The Problem of Service Quantity and Quality
As previously indicated, price and service are opposite sides
of the same coin. For any given quantum of service rendered by a
particular firm, there is an associated cost and price. This rela-
tionship facilitates monopoly regulation, since the regulatory
agency can increase prices to cover more expensive services it
wishes to mandate and it can reduce prices to reflect savings
achieved by reduced service costs. In multi-firm industries, the
price-service relationship often produces perverse results.
At the one extreme, the regulatory agency may be unable to
achieve service improvements because the firm involved pleads
poverty. The plea may be a valid one because, subjected to com-
petition by stronger firms, the particular firm is experiencing in-
adequate earnings. Yet the regulatory agency may be unable to
channel additional revenues to a particular firm without raising
prices generally, thereby providing windfalls to more favorably
situated firms. At the other extreme, a firm with high earnings
may be in a position to augment its service beyond the point the
regulatory agency deems justified, increasing the cost of that firm
and of others compelled by competitive conditions to emulate the
actions of the initiator. Yet the agency may be reluctant to inter-
vene (or statutorily restricted from doing so) because service com-
petition among multiple firms is considered a virtue. The two
examples are not hypothetical: the first has been a major factor in
the long history of service problems in the railroad industry; 55 the
second depicts the stimulation of wasteful competition in the air-
line industry.56 Of course, if revenues are kept at inadequate
levels for prolonged periods, even more acute service problems
may be anticipated. If prices do not reflect true economic costs,
investors will not assist in the rehabilitation of the railroads; 57 and
under prior regulatory controls natural gas producers were reluc-
tant to sell their product to interstate pipelines or to augment
their supplies.5 8
3. Problems Associated with. Particular Prices and Services
Thus far the discussion has proceeded from the perspective
of the firm as a whole: the general level of prices and services. As
" See notes 29 & 32 supra.
5 See note 43 supra.
17 See note 29 supra.
5 See note 40 supra.
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in the case of monopoly enterprises, however, most industries in-
volving multiple regulated firms are engaged in serving different
classes of customers, offering differentiated services at distinct
prices.
The problem of differential pricing presents some of the
same complexities here as it does in the case of monopoly enter-
prise. But in the context of competing firms the issue is more
pressing, since the reduction of a particular price by one firm may
seriously impair the earnings of its rivals and may even threaten
their survival. As a practical matter, this threat cannot be ignored
by the regulatory agency. It feels a responsibility for the "health"
of the adversely affected rivals, in part simply because they are
subject to its jurisdiction and in part because the impairment of
earnings, or possible discontinuance of operations, may reduce or
eliminate service to some classes of customers. In most multi-firm
regulated industries, therefore, the principal focus of price regu-
lation is not on protecting consumers from monopolistic exploita-
tion, but on protecting rivals from vigorous price competition.
This phenomenon has been most pronounced in the regulation of
rail, motor and water transportation, 59 but has occurred as well in
airline regulation and in some other multi-firm contexts. 61
In general, the initiator of the price reduction seeks to de-
fend it on the ground that the incremental revenues to be derived
exceed the incremental costs to be incurred. Opponents of the
price reduction argue that pricing on such a basis disadvantages
firms that are limited in their operations to the area of competi-
tion and must recover their total costs, and not merely their in-
cremental costs, from the services in issue. They contend that the
initiator's price reduction should be disallowed unless it covers not
only incremental costs, but some appropriate share of the unallo-
cated overhead of the initiating enterprise. The regulatory agen-
cies generally adopt the position of the opponents and restrict
price competition accordingly. 6' Thus, the competitive rivalry
59 See W. ALLEN & B. HYMSON, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION'S STAFF
ANALYSIS OF THE COST AND BENEFITS OF SURFACE TRANSPORT REGULATION (1977) (citing
additional unpublished studies); G. HILTON, supra note 29, at 47-78; J. MEYER, M. PECK, J.
STENASEN & C. ZWICK supra note 23, at 243-73; U.S. TASK FORCE ON RAILROAD PRODUCTIV-
ITY, supra note 29, at 36-47, 191-97; Friedlaender, The Social Costs of Regulating the Rail-
roads, 61 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 226 (1971); Gellman, supra note 32; Moore, supra
note 16; Nelson, supra not6 29, at 7; Nelson, Toward Rational Price Policies, in THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION 115 (E. Williams ed. 1971).
60 See note 38 supra.
61 For a major decision on this issue, see American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville
& Nashville Ry. Co., 392 U.S. 571 (1968). On the prologue to this decision, see W. JONES,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES 678-705 (2d ed. 1976).
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that is permitted in the multi-firm regulated industry may be nar-
rowly circumscribed by the regulatory agency.
A similar problem may be presented by new service offerings.
Those disadvantaged by the offering will seek to prevent it by
urging that it does not permit the initiator to recoup the total
costs of the offering or that it contravenes some other aspect of
regulatory policy.6" Moreover, where multiple firms are engaged
in competitive relationships, the scope of those relationships is
often defined by the regulatory agency. A firm may be authorized
to serve one geographical area, or one type of customer or service
demand, but not others. Allegations of unauthorized violations of
these boundaries are frequent in the multi-firm industries, par-
ticularly the transportation industries.6 3
The net effect of this type of regime is that the energies of
the regulated firms tend to be directed, not so much to the provi-
sion of improved service or lower prices, but to the prevention of
actions by others that may provide improved service or lower
prices. The competitive rivalry is suppressed in the marketplace
and intensified in the regulatory arena. This diversion of energy
and attention is not conducive to innovation, improved economic
performance or increased consumer welfare.
III
GENERAL WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS
A. The Relevance of the Regulatory Experience
Government price controls applied to specific industries have
been far from satisfactory. Regulation of natural monopolies
under favorable conditions has proven to be a difficult task, and
in the competitive industries price controls have had perverse,
and sometimes devastating, effects. Is this regulatory experience
relevant in evaluating economy-wide wage and price controls? 64
Undoubtedly there are differences. But are the differences mate-
rial?
62 See, e.g., Grain in Multiple Car Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 321 I.C.C.
582 (1963), on remand from partial judicial reversal, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965).
6" See, e.g., Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n, 314 I.C.C. 5 (1961), aff'd, Cooper
Jarrett, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S.
6 (1964).
64 For surveys of general wage-price controls subsequent to World War II, see CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, INCOMES POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1977); C. GOODWIN,
EXHORTATION AND CONTROLS: THE SEARCH FOR A WAGE-PRICE POLICY, 1945-1971 (1975).
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1. Differences in Scope
Regulatory measures are concerned with specific industries,
and are viewed as exercises in microeconomic policy, while gen-
eral wage-price controls are concerned with the economy as a
whole, and are considered to be an aspect of macroeconomic pol-
icy. But every general wage-price guideline has to be applied with
some attention to the context of its application. As the controls
are elaborated, distinctions and exceptions are made that result in
essentially an industry-by-industry, and sometimes a firm-by-firm,
approach.
2. Diferences in Focus
Wage-price controls are concerned with maintaining existing
wage and price levels, or restraining the rate of increase in these
levels, and accordingly do not require the degree of surveillance
imposed in specific industry regulation. But underlying both gen-
eral wage-price controls and specific regulation is the phenome-
non of change. Inflationary forces are pushing costs up in a
nonuniform manner, and technological and institutional de-
velopments are also affecting costs in a nonuniform way. The net
effect is that, in both contexts, particular companies will be seek-
ing to revise prices (almost always in an upward direction) because
of changes in costs. In both cases, practical implementation re-
quires individualized responses.
3. Differences in Standards
The standards to be applied are not the same under general
wage-price controls and specific industry regulation. Granted that
there is some variation in standards, not only between the two
types of programs but also within each type of program, is not the
central question the same: to what extent is a price increase jus-
tified? Conventional public utility regulation responds to this
question by asking whether projected revenues are sufficient to
On the Nixon Administration's program, see M. KOSTERS, CONTROLS AND INFLATION:
THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM IN RETROSPECT (1975); R. LANZILLOTrI, M. HAMIL-
TON & R. ROBERTS, PHASE II IN REVIEW: THE PRICE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE (1975); J.
POHLMAN, INFLATION UNDER CONTROL? (1976); WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS: THE U.S. Ex-
PERIMENT (J. Kraft & B. Roberts eds. 1975); A. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY
THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 1971 (1973).
See also Trebing, The Economic Consequences of Wage-Price Guidelines, FED. RES. BANK ST.
Louis REv., Dec. 1978, at 2.
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cover all legitimate costs, including capital costs. Specific regula-
tion in competitive sectors sometimes has tried to use the same
methodology, usually without success, but also has turned to some
of the same factors that are employed in general wage-price pro-
grams: emphasis on historical relationships and protection of pre-
vious profit margins (expressed as a mark-up over costs). In an
economy characterized by fluidity, there is no assurance that such
haphazard methodologies will yield satisfactory answers. Indeed,
the answers often will be perverse: perpetuating financial
stringency for firms initially in a low-profit posture and permit-
ting excessive returns for firms initially in a high-profit posture.
4. Differences in Duration
General wage-price programs typically have been temporary
in character, responding to particular crises, while specific indus-
try regulation is of a continuing character. This may have been
the pattern in the past, but are not contemporaneous inflationary
pressures of a more durable nature, calling for a sustained pro-
gram if any is to be adopted? Indeed, it is precisely the prospect
that wage and price controls may become a permanent institution
that makes the results of specific industry regulation more rele-
vant than the crisis-oriented controls of World War II or the Ko-
rean conflict. It should also be emphasized that wartime controls
also have a more limited objective than peacetime controls: they
are considered to be successful if they defer inflation until the war
has been concluded. But would peacetime controls be regarded as
successful if the result is renewed and more rampant inflation
after each period of price stability achieved under intermittent
implementation of controls?
To assess the probability that wage-price controls may be
employed on a continuing basis, and the role such controls might
be expected to play, it is necessary to examine the causes of infla-
tion to which wage and price controls might be expected to re-
spond.
a. Excess Demand. Inflation may be caused by "excess de-
mand"- the generation of purchasing power, through growth of
money supply and of credit, more rapidly than the ability of the
economy to produce goods and services. This appears to be the
principal cause of both past and present inflation, and the remedy
clearly is to reduce excessive growth of purchasing power. There
may be reluctance to apply the remedies of fiscal and monetary
stringency because of their effect in slowing the economy and in-
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creasing unemployment. But using wage and price controls as a
substitute implies either of two consequences: (1) maintaining
such controls indefinitely, or (2) imposing such controls temporar-
ily until the condition of excess demand has been abated. Since
past inflation has not sufficed to limit governmental authorities in
the generation of excess demand, is it reasonable to assume that a
control program can be effectively linked with abatement of ex-
cess demand? In the face of recession and unemployment, will not
the government be under pressure to set in motion forces produc-
ing excess demand? The prognosis is that controls, if employed at
all, will need to be reactivated from time to time to be effective in
this context.
b. Cost Push. Inflation often is also attributed to a "cost push"
phenomenon: powerful firms and labor unions push up costs and
prices that trigger upward adjustments in costs and prices
throughout the economy. There are both theoretical and empiri-
cal objections to this explanation of inflation,6 " but for present
purposes its validity will be assumed. To strike at this source of
inflation, either of two courses must be followed: (1) structural
reforms must be made with a view to eliminating the power of the
unions and firms deemed to be responsible for inflation, or (2)
more or less permanent controls must be directed at restraining
the wage and price behavior of these unions and firms over an
indefinite period. The second course of action is the one here
challenged. Powerful unions and firms are least likely to be re-
strained by simple across-the-board controls, since by hypothesis
they begin from a posture of advantage. Any general program,
applied equally to all, will do nothing to restrain their relative ad-
vantage. But to apply wage and price controls to powerful unions
and firms in a more rigorous manner involves an industry-by-
industry approach, which probably would not differ materially
from past specific industry regulation in either objective or
method.
c. Factor Prices. Finally, inflation may be the product of in-
creases in specific factor prices, particularly raw materials such as
food and fuel, and increases triggered by inflation itself, such as
higher interest rates. Wage and price controls are largely irrelevant
to this source of inflation, since there is little choice but to permit
" See, e.g., Dalton & Quails, Market Structure and Inflation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 17
(1969). This review of the literature reveals the highly dubious nature of any relation.
Dalton and Qualls's conclusions to the contrary are not supported by the studies reviewed.
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these increased costs, which are largely uncontrollable, to be re-
flected in prices. If it is believed that these increases are being
augmented by excessive charges by middlement, the problem be-
comes one aspect of the more general phenomenon of "cost push"
inflation previously disctissed. Moreover, with respect to fuel costs
at least, it is likely the the problem will not be transitory.
5. Differences in Application
General economic controls apply to wages as well as prices,
while specific industry regulation does not concern itself with
wages in any significant way. Partly for this reason, the present
discussion has focused almost entirely on prices. The addition of
wage controls simply makes the problem more difficult rather
than less. My impression is that standards for establishing wage
levels by government decree are even less certain than standards
for determining prices. But I will happily leave this aspect of the
problem for consideration by others.
B. The Prognosis for General Controls
A general program of wage and price controls poses prob-
lems that seriously impede effectiveness. To control price without
controlling the nature of the product permits price increases to be
imposed through product variation. To declare price limits with-
out a system analogous to filed tariffs on particular products
makes evasion almost impossible to detect; it also makes remedies
for past overcharges difficult to apply in many cases. To attempt
to reach judgments based on costs without controlling accounting
methods is to invite self-serving manipulation in an area where
such manipulation is notorious. In all of these respects, a price
administration authority would be working with significantly less
authority than the typical regulatory agency. To expect it to suc-
ceed where the regulatory agencies have fared so poorly requires
an enormous leap of faith.
It should be clear, finally, what the price of failure is. Gov-
ernment regulation of prices may result in price levels that are too
high or too low compared to the levels that would be achieved by
competitive markets. The consequences of low prices -prices in-
adequate to cover legitimate costs and to attract needed capital-
are predictable. Service will deteriorate, necessary capital im-
provements will not be made, and ultimately shortages will occur.
Rationing will be required in the short run and government sub-
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sidization will be required in the long run. This is probably the
more serious risk in a program designed to keep prices down. But
wage-price programs also may cause prices to rise above levels
needed to cover costs and attract necessary capital as particular
firms and industries profit from the complexities and in-
adequacies of the program. In such an event, output will be re-
stricted in a manner analogous to a cartel's restriction of output,
with resultant misallocation of resources and suboptimal economic
performance.
Whether prices are set at too high or too low a level, the
result will be inefficient performance and a decline in the nation's
productivity. The one point on which there is a consensus -
whether the theory of inflation is excess demand, cost push, or
raw material scarcity - is that declining productivity can only
make matters worse. Low productivity necessarily widens the gap
between income and expectations, and increases inflationary pres-
sures. If productivity is impaired, the result almost certainly will
be more inflation, not less, over the long term, with frustrations
mounting as the gap between income and expectations grows ever
wider. This is the most dangerous aspect of wage-price controls:
that by adversely affecting productivity they may disable us from
pursuing the only course -improvement in productivity- that is
likely to provide any meaningful relief from inflationary pres-
sures.
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